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Let SLeeping LawyerS Lie: Organized Crime, LawyerS 
and the reguLatiOn Of LegaL ServiCeS
david middleton and michael Levi*
The study examines the range of crimes in which solicitors become involved as primary offenders 
(mainly fraud) or on behalf of others (criminal planning and money laundering) and critically reviews 
the factors in their personal and working environment that may promote or inhibit such crimes and 
the ways that criminologists and socio-legal scholars have accounted for deviance and the regulation 
of the profession. It ends by discussing trends in contemporary lawyering and its regulation—ethics, 
discipline, ownership and surveillance—that could plausibly affect rates of crime by solicitors, focusing 
on England and Wales but also giving some comparative context with the United States.
Keywords: lawyers, organized crime enablers, fraud, money laundering, professional 
regulation
Introduction
it is broadly accepted that explanations of crime that focus solely on the motivations of 
‘primary offenders’ are too narrow. in academic, policy and practitioner circles, there 
is increasing interest in the hinterland of crime commission, which now goes under 
the generic name of organized crime ‘enablers’ (world economic forum 2012; Serious 
Organised Crime agency 2013: para 5.20). this includes lawyers as crime facilitators 
on a spectrum from active conspirators through wilfully blind to unwitting actors. the 
uK home Ofice expects that between 100 and 200 ‘enablers’, including lawyers and 
accountants, not currently caught by conspiracy laws, would be jailed each year under 
a new offence of participating in an organized crime group in the Serious Crime Bill 
2014 (travis 2014). a  europol threat assessment shares the view of the australian 
Crime Commission (2013) when it notes: ‘Certain enablers…provide opportunities for 
different OCgs…. these horizontal crime enablers include…corruption, legal busi-
ness structures (LBS) and professional expertise’ (europol 2013: 10). So there is broad 
enforcement consensus that lawyers can and do help ‘organized crime’.
an early manifestation of this ‘crime enabler’ approach was in situational crime 
prevention models of ‘organized crime’ (Levi and maguire 2004; Bullock et al. 2010). 
however, there has developed a substantive interest also in the mechanics of crime 
commission and how networks facilitate or inhibit the pathways to particular sorts of 
crime (morselli 2009; see also Levi 2012; paoli 2014). Lawyers both commit fraud for 
themselves and facilitate crimes committed by others, including acts under the rubrics 
of ‘white-collar’ and ‘organized’ crime. middleton and Levi (2004) reviewed the role of 
solicitors in crime commission, especially when they were under pressure from declin-
ing business turnover or demanding partnership performance, but also when they 
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developed unsustainable gambling and sex habits. their status and special protections 
for Legal professional privilege (which do not apply where solicitors are reasonably 
suspected of actively facilitating crime) make surveillance and seizure of documents 
more dificult than they are for other enforcement targets. we revisit the issues because 
of shifts in economic pressures and in the legal profession and its regulation. thus, we 
examine the range of crimes in which—as far as anyone reasonably knows—a small 
minority of solicitors become involved and critically review factors in their personal 
and professional environment that may promote or inhibit such crimes. we end by 
discussing trends in contemporary lawyering and its regulation that could plausibly 
affect rates of crime by solicitors, focusing on england and wales but also giving some 
comparative context.
The Context of Lawyer Misconduct
a legacy of the Labour government ousted in may 2010 is the 380 plus pages of the 
Legal Services act 2007 which created an oversight regulator, the Legal Services Board 
(LSB), and allowed non-lawyers to own and control law irms. the level of understand-
ing of the implications for fraud and organized crime control at a political level was 
neatly encapsulated by a Labour minister’s comment (BBC news 2005):
i don’t see why consumers should not be able to get legal services as easily as they can buy a tin of 
beans.
this its nicely with the devaluation of the professions generally, begun under the 
thatcher government, treating them as simply trade associations lobbying for their 
own economic interests (abel 2003: 472; Boon 2011). in an era when inancial services 
‘success’ and ‘innovation’ were naively celebrated, the legal profession became an easy 
target for neo-liberals to open up the legal market to non-lawyers (Clementi 2004: para 
37), implemented in 2011. thus, ‘legal services providers’ now include non-lawyers. 
the likely impacts of non-lawyer ownership of law irms, known by the lifeless phrase 
Alternative Business Structures (aBS), are not our main subject here. Our primary purpose 
is to review the current landscape of such facilitation and inhibition of wrongdoing.
the academic disciplinary silos mentioned in passing in 2004 have been eroded 
only slightly. mainstream criminology has paid little attention to professional miscon-
duct (Simpson and weisburd 2009: 6). Seeking ‘to produce a “virtuous profession”’ 
(economides and rogers 2009: 17), legal ethics scholarship in the united Kingdom 
has shown little interest in lawyers who facilitate serious wrongdoing, other than the 
miners’ compensation scandal (Boon 2012). the highly developed legal ethics litera-
ture in the united States remains mostly focused on lawyerly propriety rather than on 
the interaction of lawyers and crime. Langevoort (2010; 2012) followed up his seminal 
work on lawyer involvement in the savings and loans scandal (Langevoort 1993; 1998), 
asking ‘where were the lawyers?’ the inancial services disaster of the noughties might 
lead one to ask ‘where are the white-collar criminal defendants?’ (Sanctions on senior 
individuals were hard to ind before 2014. however, the main focus of critics of the 
inancial crisis has been on bankers, regulators and—on corporate tax—accounting 
irms, rather than on lawyers.)
abel’s work focuses not on lawyers’ crimes but on cases of ‘neglect, excessive fees 
and over-zealous advocacy’ (2008: 56), though it applies learning from white-collar 
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criminals’ rationalizations (abel 2008: 508; and see hall and holmes 2008). his sec-
ond book on the subject comments ‘i excluded… misappropriation… because the 
behaviour is straightforward’ (abel 2011: viii), a view we consider to be mistaken. 
Occasionally, there are investigations by journalists and Congressional Committees 
into lawyers, one of which accused the Conn Law firm of scheming with administrative 
law Judge david B. daugherty (and doctors) to approve more than 1,800 disability cases 
from 2006 to 2010 at an extraordinarily high rate. when this was exposed by the Wall 
Street Journal, the judge then retired (and was reported as having attempted suicide) 
(uS Senate 2013).
despite ‘regulators’ of lawyers in the united States seldom holding them to account 
for their role, particularly if they are from large irms (abel 2008: 54), the role of law-
yers as ‘gatekeepers’ has been examined (Coffee 2006: 192)—a role which they dislike 
and refuse to accept (pace obligations in many countries to report suspicions of their 
clients under money laundering regulations and garland’s view of the trend towards 
‘responsibilization’ of civil society in crime control).1 ‘gatekeeping’ has been employed 
by the financial action task force (fatf) to describe and prescribe the role of law-
yers and other professionals in controlling access to corporate secrecy, et cetera (fatf 
2004; see also american Bar association 2003; iBa 2014). the focus of the fatf and 
of anti-grand Corruption campaigners against disguised beneicial ownership of busi-
ness vehicles for crime makes this a battleground for some time to come, especially 
since g8 and g20 adoption of this transparency in 2013 as a key theme in the regula-
tion of global ‘bads’ (fatf 2013).
Little has been written about lawyer wrongdoing in the united Kingdom, and the 
largest of the approved regulators, the Solicitors regulation authority (Sra), has 
not historically published much analysed data. however, it has now published its risk 
framework, risk index and its (intended to be annual) risk Outlook. there is also raw 
information available such as web access to the indings of the Solicitors disciplinary 
tribunal (Sdt); and many regulatory decisions by the Sra previously kept private are 
now published on its website.
Some legal ethics scholars might counter that the facilitation of serious wrongdoing 
simply renders the lawyer a party to crime, taking the issue out of legal ethics and into that 
of ‘clear’ criminality (and a job for law enforcement rather than for professional regula-
tors). middleton (2005) has critiqued this view but abel’s comment—‘the problem is that 
if the threat of criminal punishment does not deter, professional discipline is unlikely to 
do so’ (abel 2011: 456)—indicates a need to look closely at the balance between regula-
tion and criminal prosecution in different jurisdictions, taking into account speed and 
preventative effects as well as symbolism. But law enforcement is unlikely ever to have 
suficient resource to investigate and prosecute more than a tiny proportion of serious 
fraud and money laundering. Since obtaining evidence against lawyers suficient to lead 
to their conviction is very dificult for them (despite examples in the ‘direct facilitation 
of crime’ section below), this disincentivises criminal investigations, since modern mana-
gerial and austerity policing regards it as a waste of resources to investigate where the 
chances of conviction or ‘signiicant disruption’ are not high. pragmatically, regulatory 
action such as closing down a law irm or controlling how a lawyer may practise provides 
1 the uK legal profession is by far the most likely in the world to report suspicions of money laundering by their clients, 
though there are no serious studies rigorously analysing either outputs or outcomes from these reports (see fatf 2013).
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more direct public protection and indeed disruption, at less social cost, than does pros-
ecution. about 69 per cent of solicitors surveyed considered that the prospect of enforce-
ment action provides credible deterrence (Law Society 2013).
middleton and Levi (2004: 141) noted that the risks of organized criminal groups using 
law irms as ‘fronts’ for their criminal activities ‘could be a particularly dangerous scenario 
since the criminals then have access to all of the privileges and protections available to law-
yers, including receiving legal aid money, transferring money through conidential client 
accounts, and conducting litigation’. however, the risks of non-lawyer control of law irms 
were summarily dismissed by Clementi (2004: 116), writing before the inancial crisis led 
most people to question the net social beneits of ‘light touch regulation’:
Opening up ownership brings the risk of inappropriate owners of a legal practice. a few have given 
short answers as to why only lawyers should be ‘it to own’ a legal practice; this has been to refer to 
whoever they regard as the villain of the moment or, in default, ‘robert maxwell Legal’.2 there is 
a point to be addressed on the issue of ‘it to own’. But the short answer is an insuficient one, just 
as the words ‘South Sea Bubble’ would not have been a suficient reason for our forefathers to have 
prevented all new public share offers.
Such bullish attitudes are less celebrated today, but it is doubtful if reckless lawyers 
could do as much harm as bankers to the public, though they facilitate the behaviours 
of ‘predicate criminals’ and could damage conidence in the legal profession.
Lawyer misconduct needs to be seen within the evolving social construction of ‘organ-
ized crime’. the uK government’s previous organized crime strategy (hm government 
2011: 5) states:
Organised crime involves individuals, normally working with others, with the capacity and capabil-
ity to commit serious crime on a continuing basis, which includes elements of planning, control and 
coordination, and beneits those involved.
its revised strategy heralds both a broader and looser construction when it states (hm 
government 2013: paras 2.5 and 2.6):
[O]rganised crime is serious crime planned, coordinated and conducted by people working together 
on a continuing basis. their motivation is often, but not always, inancial gain….organised criminals 
very often depend on the assistance of corrupt, complicit or negligent professionals, notably lawyers, 
accountants and bankers. [italics not in original].
this is the rationale for a deterrence/disruption/incapacitation approach to reducing 
the ability and willingness of lawyers to help ‘serious criminals’.
Previous Categorizations of Solicitors Facilitating Wrongdoing
middleton and Levi (2004) identiied various categories and settings: mortgage fraud, 
high-yield investment fraud or bank instrument fraud, legal aid fraud, immigration law practice, 
fraudulent claims for inancial loss, theft of client money, tax fraud and inancial schemes. in 
this section, we will review most of these categories (although tax fraud requires more 
space than we have available here). in the next section, we will look at some other or 
emerging threats.
2 named after the litigation-prone deceased fraudulent entrepreneur.
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the overall picture has changed signiicantly. the forms of wrongdoing have 
changed, and economic pressures led the Sra to issue dire warnings about 150 irms 
facing ‘inancial instability’ problems (Baksi 2013), while long-established law irms 
have failed (the Lawyer 2013). major government legal aid cuts have reduced legal 
aid fraud, and problems with immigration law practice are less evident but have not 
disappeared (e.g. Legal futures 2013a). fraudulent claims for loss against the Sra 
Compensation fund (SCf) have not become common but have been superseded by 
theft of law irms’ identities (Legal futures 2012b). theft of client money has continued 
and now appears to take the form of theft of the mortgage advance rather than the 
acquisition of property for longer term gain in a rising market.
High-yield investment fraud
high-yield investment fraudsters stopped targeting the legal services sector on the scale 
seen in the late 1990s and early 2000s: but a sharp rise in 2013 led the Sra to issue 
a new warning (Sra 2013a). two drivers of change seem salient: collective memory 
loss by law irms or perhaps even by older/new fraudsters about tough regulation; and 
banks’ reluctance to lend to business may have led some law irms to pursue high risk 
lending or investment schemes to keep themselves aloat.
a solicitor was convicted after a loan of £17m was obtained on the basis of false 
claims that £76m was held in bank accounts. grandiose claims included that money was 
‘to fund the development of a luxury turkish resort’ and that famous sportsmen had 
bought villas. ‘investor’ scepticism can be disarmed by support from an accredited pro-
fessional; ‘undertakings’ from a law irm can provide this validation (middleton and 
Levi 2004: 139). here, the lawyer provided false letters and an undertaking from three 
(unsuspecting) ‘fellow … partners guaranteeing’ that the fraudster was a wealthy and 
successful businessman (daily mail 2011; see Steele Sdt 10956/2012; see also Farmiloe 
Sdt 10257-2009 and Yildiz Sdt 10997-2012).
in 2011, a solicitor pleaded guilty to fraud and was jailed for 17  months (Serious 
fraud Ofice [SfO] 2011a). the SfO indicated that it had been contacted by numerous 
would-be commercial borrowers, but none had received the promised loans, although 
over £4m in fees were taken from over a hundred of them (SfO 2011b). his involvement 
was also fairly standard:
[he] was a practising [sic] solicitor who ran a small conveyancing irm … from an ofice above a shoe 
shop in godalming… used … to provide written and oral re-assurance as a supposedly independent 
professional, to concerned or uncommitted applicants that the company was substantial and could 
meet its inancial obligations.
investors are not usually in a position to test the value of professional assurances, though 
in this case, google Street view might have given them a clue about the size of the law irm.
Financial schemes
Some law irms did not heed lessons from the action taken against those who promoted 
high-yield investments and became over-involved in boiler room frauds, bringing irms 
to the attention of the then financial Services authority (fSa) as well as the Sra. One 
Let SLeeping LawyerS Lie
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irm’s overseas operations used promotions to sell shares to 670 investors in the united 
Kingdom for uS$21m (fSa 2009). eventually, the fSa decided on a penalty of just 
over £450,000 (fSa 2011). perhaps because they had already been punished, the Sdt 
ordered that one partner be suspended for 12 months, one was modestly ined and oth-
ers were reprimanded.3 a solicitor who signed off misleading advertisements for boiler 
room scams operating from Spain was permanently banned from working in inancial 
services. he and his irm were ined £400,000. the advertisements offered free research 
reports to get hold of consumers’ telephone numbers, leading to ‘pressurised selling 
of high-risk illiquid shares in unlisted small companies’ (fSa 2010a). at least 130 con-
sumers lost most of their investments totalling over £3m. he was then suspended for 
18 months but not banned by the Sdt (hyde 2014; see also private eye 2014).4
Some solicitors have been involved in land-banking scams, in which promoters buy 
land to sell on in small parcels to ‘investors’ on the false expectation that if and when 
planning permission is obtained to develop it, they will make substantial proits. the 
Sra and fSa published warnings about these scams, the former providing a case study 
in which a solicitor was struck off (Sra 2011b). in another case, partners in a substantial 
irm were ined.5 the seriousness of the penalty is largely driven by whether the solici-
tor could be shown to have acted dishonestly or recklessly.
Mortgage fraud
the economic crisis of 2008 onwards lushed out substantial losses incurred by lenders, 
and (as after the 1989 property crash) they sought to recover some of those losses from 
the transaction lawyers. it was reported in november 2011 that there ‘are now 770 open 
claims against the SCf relating to mortgage fraud, worth a massive £173m, compared to 
323 a year ago, when they were worth £103m’ (Legal futures 2011c). Such igures need 
to be treated with caution because of the wide range of behaviours which are described 
as mortgage fraud and because lenders notify the SCf of losses to comply with time lim-
its but are required to pursue other remedies irst. Clearly, however, substantial losses 
were incurred by lenders.
middleton and Levi (2004) reported the coded irritation of the courts at claims 
against solicitors. the Court of appeal in late 2012 made a direct policy decision to 
allocate loss to a lender rather than to the law irm it had sued.6 the law irm had non-
negligently released mortgage monies to complete buying a property but it was stolen 
by the recipients. to term such lawyers ‘enablers’ might be technically correct but mor-
ally mistaken. there are other contested attempts in which insurers try to shift the 
burden of losses away from themselves (Baksi 2011; hyde 2012).
mortgage fraud appears still relatively easy to commit. a foreign lawyer registered 
with the Sra to work in a law irm was sentenced to seven years in prison as being ‘at 
the helm of a criminal gang that defrauded high street banks out of almost £8m by tak-
ing out mortgages on properties they did not own’ and indeed for consequential money 
laundering when ‘the stolen money was quickly transferred from the solicitor’s account 
3 Manning and others Sdt 10105-2008.
4 Greystoke Sdt 11014-2012.
5 Baptist and others Sdt 10494-2010.
6 Davisons v Nationwide Building Society [2012] ewCa Civ 1626. See also Santander UK Plc v RA Legal Solicitors [2014] ewCa Civ 
183. See also Lloyds TSB Bank plc v Markandan & Uddin [2012] 2 all er 884 and AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co [2013] 
ewCa Civ 45.
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into a network of bank accounts, controlled by {y] and the rest of the gang. the money 
was then withdrawn in cash’ (Legal futures 2012a). the Sra had already closed down 
the irm in february 2009, and y was struck off the register of foreign lawyers in 2010.
the organized, determined and alarmingly simple nature of this fraud is evidenced 
by the opening description of the facts of a case in which the Sra sought to recover 
losses of over £6m in respect of two law irms it had closed down, S and pn. S ‘would 
complete all of the conveyancing forms necessary to procure the payment of the mort-
gage advance by the lender to [S] and its lodgement in [S’s] client account in readi-
ness for completion. the conveyancing transaction would then be abandoned’ and the 
money paid away. pn was doing the same. a judge noted that over £1m was paid out of 
the S client account and £5.2m from the pn account.7 rather than acrimonious civil 
suits, a more indirect and forward looking approach is action by lenders to control the 
law irms who act for them (Legal futures 2011b; Smithers 2012).
the substantial losses arising from mortgage fraud led insurers to largely welcome 
the proposal to exclude claims by inancial institutions from compulsory professional 
indemnity cover (Sra 2011a: para 5.11). the Law Society in its representative role 
(Legal futures 2011a) and brokers and inancial institutions opposed this move (Sra 
2011a: para 5.2). an independent review commissioned by the Sra showed that ‘con-
veyancing claims represent by far and away the largest proportion of claims compared 
to all other categories’ (malcolm et al. 2010: 38). the Sra decided not to proceed for 
the time being but to conduct further research including ‘consideration of which parts 
of the process are most susceptible to negligence and fraud, whether there should be 
explicit authorization to conduct conveyancing, whether the conveyancing process itself 
should be altered; or whether alternative approaches could be used to provide protec-
tion to clients’ (Sra 2011a: para 5.20). that represents a welcome recognition of the 
need to address situational prevention by regulatory tools, the most interesting being 
the potential for positive licensing for those irms that wish to conduct conveyancing. 
But efforts continue to reduce potential claims (Legal futures 2014; Sra 2014a; 2014b).
Money laundering or improper use of client account
the extent and nature of the facilitation of money laundering by lawyers is disputed 
(iBa 2014). professionals insist allegations of such involvement are in reports which 
comprise either lightly analysed lists of cases in multiple jurisdictions (fatf 2013) or 
assertions citing closed source material which cannot be tested. a striking example was 
the publication in June 2010 of the united nations Ofice on drugs and Crime (unOdC 
2010a) report on transnational organized crime. the then executive director asserted 
in a press release that law enforcement against maia groups would not be effective 
while ‘the underlying markets remain unaddressed, including the army of white-collar 
criminals—lawyers, accountants, realtors and bankers—who cover them up and laun-
der their proceeds’ (unOdC 2010b).
yet in the report itself, remarkably, neither ‘lawyer’ nor ‘accountant’ appears, nor 
does the report say anything about professionals laundering money, nor have any 
underlying data been published elsewhere for independent review. regrettably, such 
evidence-free headline metaphors can still drive or be used to ‘ justify’ control policies. 
7 The Law Society of England & Wales v Isaac & Isaac International Holdings Limited and others [2010] ewhC 1670 (Ch).
Let SLeeping LawyerS Lie
page 7 of 22
 at A
cquisitions on M
arch 16, 2015
http://bjc.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
unOdC did not cite our previous review or the evidence provided of laundering by 
solicitors in england and wales, disclosing at least £240 million laundered and a fur-
ther uS$557 million moved through law irms in connection with high-yield investment 
frauds (middleton 2008). although the fatf (2013: 8) cite middleton and Levi (2004), 
they have not included studies that set out empirical evidence more analytically, prefer-
ring simply to list lawyer malefactions.
a case that contributed to ‘our’ total of £240 million has been appealed8 since a 
commentary by middleton (2008). it arose from wrongdoing involving many millions 
of dollars and the former zambian president Chiluba, bravely but unsuccessfully pros-
ecuted in zambia by one of our ex-students, the late maxwell nkole, who was sacked 
by the then president when he insisted on appealing against the acquittal. One of the 
solicitors was found dishonest in the high Court and was struck off9 in relation to par-
ticular payments from client account, including turning ‘a blind eye to the glaringly 
obvious’ concern that Chiluba was suspected of dishonesty.10
he was also found grossly reckless for permitting money to pass through client 
account when there was no underlying legal transaction and failing to be alert to the 
very substantial sums of money passing through client account and circumstances 
which should have put him on inquiry as to their authenticity or legitimacy. On related 
facts, another solicitor, mr m, was found dishonest by the high Court but that was 
overturned on appeal. at least uS$7m had been paid into his irm’s client account.11 
although mr m’s ‘conduct showed serious failings in terms of professional conduct’, the 
Court of appeal did ‘not agree that his misunderstanding of the original [Law Society] 
Blue Card warnings, and his failure to take on board the signiicance of them or of 
later versions of the same guidance, are supportive of a inding of dishonesty’. he was 
held to be ‘much less knowledgeable and experienced, in relevant matters, than he may 
have thought himself to be, or held himself out as being’. ignorance can be a defence 
to a dishonesty allegation, it seems. mr m was found by the Sdt to have been grossly 
reckless and was suspended for three years.12 it is often very dificult to prove both that 
money was stolen and that the solicitor knew it. to avoid that dificulty providing a free 
pass to laundering by professionals, situational prevention is critical.
One such preventative effort was the principle that solicitors should not transfer 
money through their client account unless it is in connection with a genuine trans-
action in which they are acting.13 it thus prohibits the risky behaviour without having 
to prove what the client may be up to. One case, where no allegation of impropriety 
was made against the client, involved over £13m being transferred through a client 
account, of which little or nothing related to legal advice.14 the Sra accounts rules 
2011 now include a speciic rule, 14.5, to deter this behaviour (arising from a consulta-
tion paper: Sra 2010a), belatedly relecting comments of the Court of appeal in the 
zambia case:
8 Attorney General of Zambia v Meer Care & Desai [2008] ewCa Civ 1007.
9 Thaker Sdt 9697-2007. See Judgment dated 17 april 2012 after the re-hearing following the solicitor’s appeal, the latter 
reported as Thaker v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2011] ewhC 660 (admin).
10 Thaker Sdt 9697-2007, Judgment dated 17 april 2012
11 Attorney General of Zambia v Meer Care & Desai [2008] ewCa Civ 1007, paragraph 7.
12 Meer Sdt 9575-2005.
13 See Wilson-Smith Sdt indings 8772/2003.
14 Barth, Jenkins and O’Dowd Sdt 10150-2008.
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…almost none of the payments through the client account … related to any legal work done by the 
irm. it is equally plain that this was not a proper thing for a irm of solicitors to do.15
the need to supplement criminal justice with regulatory action is also evidenced by the 
lack of convictions or indeed prosecutions of lawyers for breach of the local regulations 
arising from the eu third money Laundering directive.16 the fSa did eventually seek 
to bring criminal prosecutions for substantive money laundering offences (though not 
against lawyers), and the Supreme Court noted that it needed irst to consult with hm 
treasury.17 the fSa (now replaced by the financial Conduct authority—fCa) has also 
imposed civil inancial penalties for breach of the regulations (fSa 2010b).18
nevertheless, improper use of client account without evidence of laundering for self 
or others continues. a solicitor was struck off after passing £7m through client account 
for a client who had already been to prison.19 another irm and two partners were ined 
a total of £75,000 after £10m was moved through client account for a football club, and 
their appeal was dismissed by a strong judgment in the high Court.20 it was reported 
that the solicitors ‘used the [irm’s] account containing their clients’ money to help to 
pay football creditors and non-football creditors’ (palmer 2012).
the Sra identiied ‘inadequate systems and controls over the transfer of money’ as 
an ‘emerging risk’ in its 2013 risk Outlook (Sra 2013b: 7) (though such phraseology 
risks being tautological, being identiied whenever laundering occurs). its 2014 risk 
Outlook identiied misuse of money or assets, inadequate systems and controls over the 
transfer of money, and bogus irms as principal (crime) risks, alongside other ethical 
risks and information insecurity (Sra 2014c). it assessed money laundering as a rising 
risk and bogus irms as a new one. however, as usual also in crime threat assessments, 
these rely on forward projections of existing identiied trends rather than identifying 
problems that are in their very early stages.
Newer Categories of Risky Conduct by Lawyers
Financial instability
we would not yet claim that the autonomy given to the professions because of the social 
value of their work is a thing of the past. But the social legitimacy of lawyers is far more 
threatened than national health Service doctors (Case 2013; middleton 2014), and 
governments are continually seeking to undermine or remove its foundations, though 
abel (above) has shown how hard they are to shift, at least in america. high incomes 
and jobs for most qualiied lawyers can no longer be taken for granted, but precise 
impacts of economic strain on wrongdoing by those in employment are unknown. Such 
strains have become socially mainstream. the Chapter  11 bankruptcy of a ictional 
Chicago law irm became a recurring theme in a season of a television series (with 
15 Attorney General of Zambia v Meer Care & Desai [2008] ewCa Civ 1007, paragraph 234.
16 2005/60/eC directive... on the prevention of the use of the inancial system for the purpose of money laundering and ter-
rorist inancing.
17 R v Rollins [2010] uKSC 39, see, e.g., paragraph 23.
18 the fCa and other designated authorities can impose civil penalties rather than bringing a prosecution: regulation 42 of 
the money Laundering regulations 2007. penalties for inancial misconduct have been rising in size and frequency since that 
date, as increasingly egregious revelations about banker and other professional behaviour emerge.
19 Wong, Sdt 10791-2011.
20 Fuglers v SRA [2014] ewhC 179 (admin).
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viewing igures of between 11m and 13m according to wikipedia) including reference 
in one scene to the failure of a real law irm, dewey LeBouef (King and King 2013), 
three of whose senior personnel subsequently have been indicted for fraud, seven oth-
ers having pleaded guilty to civil charges in 2014 (goldstein 2014).
in the united Kingdom, after regulatory engagement with failing irms, resulting 
in managed closure or forcible intervention by the Sra, serious alleged misconduct of 
different types was uncovered. this suggests that (as in banking and securities offend-
ing), there is a bigger risk from larger irms than was previously thought, whereas most 
enforcement work is against small irms (abel 2008: 54). this was newsworthy (Legal 
futures 2013b). the Sra disclosed that some substantial law irms were ‘very naïve in 
their inancial management’, that well-run irms tend to have a high-quality inance 
director, and that troubled practices simply failed to accept their situation or engage 
with the Sra (middleton and Soon 2013; 2014).
in addition to extreme cases such as former uS lawyer marc dreier who ‘sold more 
than $700 million worth of fake promissory notes to hedge funds and other investors, 
and stole more than $46 million from clients…’ (weiser 2009), there is a more insidious 
problem of senior partners who—as in the broader commercial world—over-dominate 
and may affect irm culture. the Sra paper has already warned that ‘the temptation 
to be economical with the truth with funders is a very serious risk for irms’ in inancial 
dificulty. Sra cases may provide wider empirical evidence of the attitude to ethical 
behaviour in larger irms, and fear of loss is a major driver of corporate fraud.
Abusive litigation
abel comments that ‘excessive zeal… for me, is the most troubling category of lawyer 
misconduct’ (abel 2011: 456). he states that the victim is ‘the legal system, not indi-
viduals’—the opponents of the over-zealous lawyer were presumably large businesses. 
however, experience in england & wales indicates that the victims could be individual 
consumers. two partners in a large law irm were suspended and ined after they were 
involved in the sending of ‘“intimidating letters” to individuals they accused of ille-
gal ile-sharing. in 2006–09, acting on behalf of various clients, more than 6,000 let-
ters were sent to individuals claimed to have been involved in unlawful ile-sharing in 
breach of copyright law (dowell 2011). these letters demanded damages and costs and 
warned of more if the claim was not urgently settled. the lawyers denied impropriety, 
stating that they were merely acting in the client’s best interests, provided the letters’ 
contents were lawful. it was just an unfortunate consequence when one sends a letter 
relating to pornography that there would be additional pressure on the person!21
the Sra’s Risk Outlook 2013 identiies ‘improper or abusive litigation’ as a ‘potential 
risk’ and uses the ile-sharing case and miners’ compensation cases as examples (sub-
sequent to that, payday lender wonga—often criticized for its high-interest rates—was 
forced in 2014 to pay £2.6m in compensation to 45,000 customers for sending them 
threatening letters from non-existent irms ‘Barker and Lowe’ and ‘Chainey, d’amato 
and Shannon’, to induce them to pay their real debts to it [Jones 2014]). there is scope 
for criminals to threaten litigation to extort money from individuals, particularly in the 
context of the comment about pornographic material quoted above.
21 SRA v Miller and Gore, Sdt indings 10619-2010, p. 62.
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finally, there is arguably unethical litigation, such as acting for ‘vulture funds’ which 
buy up debt owed by foreign, developing country governments for a small percentage 
of its face value and then sue the government for the full sum (Blackman and mukhi 
2010). Some lawyers refuse to act for ‘vultures’ but others assert ethical neutrality or 
even duty to act (margolis, undated; Clifton 2014).
Direct facilitation of crime by lawyers
here, the primary response has been by law enforcement rather than regulators, mainly 
because of investigation techniques only available to the police. prosecuted cases are 
considerably less common than allegations of misconduct. a solicitor was convicted of 
ive counts of use of a mobile phone from prison and one of conspiracy to pervert the 
course of justice. the conspiracy was the classic worry, namely the concoction of a false 
defence:
the conspiracy had involved the agreement with others that Samuel Ogunro, a person charged with 
a serious irearms offence, should plead guilty on a false basis; the false basis being that he should 
take the full blame for the possession of a handgun and so ease the position of his co-defendants.22
a distressing aspect of this case not evident from the disciplinary indings is that Samuel 
Ogunro was 17 years old and eventually refused to go along with the scheme, following 
which he was murdered (the voice 2012).
the police presumably used their power to identify telephone activity in that case. 
Covert recording was used to investigate a solicitor called marray, described as a ‘lead-
ing underworld lawyer’, who was sentenced to two years in prison for ‘doing an act 
intended to pervert the course of justice’ by giving advice on how best to escape the 
country (Siddle 2013).
a solicitor called ditta was imprisoned for three years. it was reported that he was a 
cocaine addict and ‘tipped off drug dealers with information about a police investiga-
tion’ (hyde 2013). another solicitor, Souleiman, was jailed for 10 years for a sophisti-
cated immigration conspiracy: ‘an estimated 1,800 men, including members of the 
albanian maia, were able to live in Britain by taking part in sham marriages over 
eight years. women from eastern european countries were lown to Britain to marry 
men from outside the eu’ (BBC news 2013). yet another was sentenced to six years for 
immigration law offences after evidence of women being used for sham marriages and 
prostitution, at least one of whom was also sexually abused by the solicitor (greenwood 
2014).
Explaining Solicitor Misconduct: Opportunity and Routine Activities Approaches
Classiicatory exercises are an important prelude to making sense of solicitor miscon-
duct which we go on to sketch out in this section. Levels of motivation can shift with life-
style and the dificulty of meeting career development and inancial aspirations legally, 
especially for acts that can be readily rationalized as acceptable and are not challenged 
at the time. a theoretical approach to opportunity in the context of white-collar crime 
22 Naik Sdt 11116-2013.
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has been set out by Benson et al. (2009). Opportunity/prevention assessment requires 
a high degree of speciicity (Crawford 2007: 878; Benson et al. 2009: 177 and 184) and 
a case study approach (abel 2008: 36, 53 and 56; Benson et al. 2009: 187). this article 
seeks to provide that within its space constraints. regulatory structures aim at situ-
ational prevention: regulated industries impose ‘it and proper’ tests on admission 
and in the aftermath of public sanctions such as criminal and disciplinary convictions; 
many professionals who are subject to (or think they are subject to) oversight will be 
dissuaded from wrongdoing unless they think they can outwit surveillance or are truly 
desperate. Crawford reminds us that policing was originally a much wider conception, 
encompassing ‘regulation’ (Crawford 2007: 867; newburn and peay 2012), and that 
a masculine subculture of ‘action orientation’ inhibits prevention-oriented policing 
(868). it is moot whether austerity policing leads to a sharper focus on prevention and/
or to more symbolic reactions to ‘signal crimes’ (innes 2014). the uK national Crime 
agency aims to do both.
Benson et al. discuss three theories: routine activity, crime pattern and situational 
prevention. routine activities theory (or perspective) foregrounds the way crime 
relects victim and third party conduct, downplaying motivation (Crawford 2007: 877), 
though felson (2009) has stressed the importance of the search for co-offenders in 
transforming crime opportunities. the key fact that white-collar professionals have the 
opportunity to commit crime every day and most of them do not do so at all shows that 
opportunity is not a suficient factor (cf. abel 2008: 52; for recent discussions of this in 
‘the fraud triangle’, see Schuchter and Levi, 2013, in press).
in crime pattern theory, ‘awareness of white-collar crime opportunities arise out of 
their employment or occupation’ (Benson et al. 2009: 180). when a lawyer conducts a 
land purchase transaction funded by a mortgage, the nodes would include the client 
(often the lead or co-conspirator), the lender of the mortgage funds, the valuer of the 
premises, the seller and the seller’s lawyers, perhaps the irm in which the lawyer oper-
ates, and the land registry. in a fraudulently structured transaction such as a ‘back-to-
back’ or ‘land-lip’ (middleton and Levi 2004: 132), there would be an intermediate 
buyer or seller or indeed various parties. a study of uS doctors concluded that ‘more 
physician-related crimes occur within larger networks and by means of more commonly 
practiced procedures’ (Benson et al. 2009: 181). we can see how this may apply to the 
setting up of companies as components of fraud or money laundering schemes, but 
we ind more value in the concept of the ‘edge’. Benson et al. argue that edges are pre-
sented to white-collar criminals and evolve over time:
whenever (1) two nodes intersect using a particular path and (2) veriication systems or regulatory 
oversight is absent or ineffective at identifying criminal activity along that path. when a regulatory 
system embraces only some nodes and their associated networks, white-collar deviance will form 
along the paths connecting the regulated nodes to unregulated nodes. (Benson et al. 2009: 182)
the third aspect of opportunity theory discussed by Benson et al. is situational crime 
prevention. they set out the dimensions of criminal opportunity, strongly inluenced 
by the assumption of rational choice on the part of the offender (which we consider 
must include the attempt to avoid signiicant economic and status loss), citing Cornish 
and Clarke (2003).
Benson et al. note that white-collar wrongdoing is ‘the intersection of at least two pro-
cesses’, namely a legitimate process in the business world and an illegitimate process 
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that is parasitical on the irst. Lawyers similarly provide the same service, such as trans-
ferring real estate, to the honest and the dishonest (middleton 2012). Benson et  al. 
(2009: 185) recommend ‘making adjustments to the legitimate process that thwart the 
ability of individuals to act parasitically in relation to the legitimate process’—bringing 
to mind requirements for lawyers to verify the identity of their clients and report suspi-
cions of money laundering. But this is not an easy social design problem.
it is useful to populate the Clarke/Crawford framework of situational crime preven-
tion with our view of how it might apply to lawyers and money laundering (based on 
Crawford 2007: 874, table 26.1.s.) (table 1).
the fourth column, ‘reduce provocations’ is likely to be less relevant than others to 
white-collar crime. Benson et al. do not refer to provocation but to ‘conditions that may 
encourage criminal action’. discussing doctors improperly charging for medicaid or 
medicare, they speculate that a ‘condition that might encourage the offense would be 
the physician’s knowledge that his or her peers have engaged in similar activities’ (we 
would qualify this with ‘knowledge or belief’, since in behavioural economics [thaler 
and Sunstein 2008], it is beliefs about what others are doing that inluence behaviour, 
and these beliefs may be mistaken). in addressing the last dimension, excuses, they say 
that the doctors think they are underpaid and so ‘excuse the offense as simply making 
up for what they should have received in the irst place’ (Benson et al. 2009: 183–4). 
improper legal aid claims by lawyers offer a similar situation. anger at underpayment 
may in fact be better placed within ‘provocation’ since it is likely to be a causal factor, 
at least among those who perceive themselves to be honest. excuses for over-claiming 
and indeed for other forms of white-collar wrongdoing are more likely to be techni-
cal—it was a mistake, the system is too complex to understand, the money laundering 
regulations are unclear, and so on (abel 2008: 33; abel 2011: 463). we would add that 
although these ranges of self-exculpation are cultural, they are also individual: human 
ingenuity subconsciously can usually ind some way of matching self-interested behav-
iour to available excuses, so abstract norms may not be strong constraints, and explana-
tions of why they sometimes constrain and at other times do not (for the same people 
over time and for different people) has so far defeated criminological theory.
Some prevention strategies may seem attractive to a regulator or industry but may 
generate partial displacement. for example, preventing solicitors from acting for both 
buyer and lender in the same transaction might remove a conlict of interest and reduce 
the ability of lawyers to facilitate mortgage fraud: but it might not actually reduce the 
incidence of mortgage fraud, transferring prevention and loss costs elsewhere. the 
transfer of costs might concentrate some minds, itself a possible ‘diffusion of beneits’ 
of prevention, but silos protecting their members’ interests may produce broader mar-
ket failure (Crawford 2007: 888, citing Clarke and weisburd 1994).
The regulatory system and the sanctioning of solicitors
Since 1 January 2010, regulation of lawyers in england and wales has been overseen 
by the LSB which licenses ‘approved regulators’ such as the Law Society (in effect the 
Sra), the Bar and so on. its powers effectively cover all of the approved regulators’ 
‘regulatory arrangements’, changes to which require LSB approval. Because the LSB 
remains focused on market issues, it is still too early to say what impact this will have 
on the inhibition of serious wrongdoing. the LSB assessed the Sra’s enforcement 
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table 1  Techniques of situational crime prevention – money laundering by lawyers
increase the 
perceived effort
increase the 
perceived risk
reduce the 
anticipated 
reward
reduce 
provocations
remove excuses
money Laundering 
regulations 2007 
require checking 
of identity of 
client and other 
record-keeping
Criminal sanction 
for breach of 
money Laundering 
regulations
Loss of 
professional 
status with 
consequent 
inancial loss
By information 
campaigns and 
professional 
rules, enable 
lawyer to point 
client to clear 
prohibition and 
therefore reduce 
pressure to comply 
with dubious 
instructions
information 
campaigns such as 
the publication of 
warnings
Simplify laws and 
rules to enhance 
legitimacy of rules.
reduce ease of 
neutralization and 
rationalization
need to construct 
a ‘genuine’ 
transaction 
because 
professional rules 
require money 
to be transferred 
by lawyer only in 
normal course of a 
solicitor’s business
professional sanction 
or protective action 
for breaches, 
particularly failure to 
keep proper records
disruption: deal promptly 
with misconduct to 
reduce perception 
that others are 
‘getting away with 
it’—by direct 
action or clear 
public statements
inclusion in 
professional rules1.  take 
dishonest 
clients’ 
assets23
2.  Close down 
law irm, 
taking 
possession 
of all 
money and 
documents
extend 
guardianship by:
publicize 
regulatory action 
against offenders1.  requiring law 
irms to have 
compliance partner
2.  tasking lawyers’ 
own accountants 
with monitoring 
compliance
3.  Back up 
monitoring of 
compliance by 
regulator
Study more rigorously 
methodologies 
to understand 
how laundering is 
facilitated—and 
publicize results 
regularly, since 
individual and corporate 
memories may be short
Criminalize or make it 
misconduct for a lawyer 
wrongfully to claim 
that legal professional 
privilege applies
educate lawyers on 
legal professional 
privilege and ethics
23 for an unsuccessful attempt by a client to recover funds from the Sra because of concerns about fraud, see Halley v Law 
Society [2003] ewCa Civ 97.
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function but without substantive (as opposed to managerial) comment (LSB 2013a). 
despite the Sra’s work and law enforcement’s continual complaints about professional 
enablers, this early assessment showed no comprehension of the dangers of the facilita-
tion of fraud by legal services providers.
though we anticipate a stronger political and national Crime agency focus on ‘ena-
blers’ of the elastic term ‘organized crime’, the regulatory/criminal justice interface as 
we described in 2004 is likely to continue, at least in serious cases. the Sra (2011c) has 
moved to a classic pyramid enforcement strategy based on ‘constructive engagement 
and credible deterrence’: within resources available, serious misconduct will be met 
with a strong response, whilst irms that both can comply and are (or appear to be) will-
ing to comply with regulatory requirements will be supervised rather than investigated 
(Sra 2010b).
activity by regulators provides a primary form of situational prevention, including 
standard-setting, practice support functions and ultimately disciplinary and preventa-
tive action. we reported in 2004 that between 1994 and 2003, an average of 182 solici-
tors annually were subject to sanction at the Sdt, averaging 72 struck off, 33 suspended 
and 77 ined. updating the igures from Sdt annual reports to 2012 shows modest 
change: an increase to a total of 195 such outcomes, but a lower average igure for strike 
offs of 68, a higher igure of 38 solicitors being suspended and an increase to an average 
of 89 ined. if we exclude the earlier period, we ind that the number of ines increased 
substantially in the ive years from 2008, which show an average of 125 per year. the 
same trend is true of suspensions, averaging 48 for the last ive years. the evidence (and 
the lack of sound models connecting enforcement dose to criminal behaviour) does 
not enable us to deduce whether this active approach of uK regulators leads to less 
misconduct by uK solicitors than before or to less than in other european countries. it 
is intriguing to note that uK solicitors made 3,935 suspicious activity reports to the uK 
financial intelligence unit in 2013, compared with 180 by lawyers and notaries (from 
354  ‘unusual transaction reports’) in the netherlands, a highly active international 
economy (both criminal and licit), albeit with far fewer lawyers. But absent knowledge 
of what is done with these reports, such activity indicators are poor indicators of system 
eficiency or effectiveness (see halliday et al. 2014).
the changes to the legal services market suggest a need for theories that account for 
very different organizational contexts for lawyer offending. the profession in england 
and wales has witnessed the growth of massive, often international, practices employ-
ing hundreds of lawyers, that have little interaction with retail consumers of legal work 
(though they may be wittingly or unwittingly involved in money laundering and trans-
national corruption). in contrast, 85 per cent of law irms had four or fewer partners 
in 2012; 44 per cent of irms were sole owners. Only 2 per cent of irms had 26 or more 
partners but they employed 31 per cent of all principals and 41 per cent of all solicitors 
in private practice, namely 36,583 out of a total of 87,768 (Law Society, various, annual 
Trends in the Profession). the 58 largest irms employed a quarter of the total in practice, 
and all but 8 were London-based. in between are what is known as ‘national’ irms to 
distinguish them from the massive ‘global’ irms gazing down from London skyscrap-
ers. thus, we may need more sophisticated models of lawyer misconduct and its regula-
tion. as in other ields of white-collar crime, wrongdoing by individuals and small irms 
may be analysed via, say, individualized strain theory. however, systemic misconduct by 
the larger irms (and non-lawyer owned companies) may be analysed in the future as 
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a form of corporate or even ‘organized’ crime, accentuated by intra-irm performance 
pressures, bonuses and ‘irm culture’: though, like large organizations of all kinds, they 
may represent the misconduct as ‘rotten apple’ behaviour by lone individuals, and it 
may take years for evidence to emerge.
Conclusions
while regulation of legal services is now the subject of much study and comment, 
the relationship between lawyers and both white-collar and organized crime remains 
under-researched. we have sketched out an opportunity-based framework for inter-
preting the relationship as well as some relevant data here, while noting that oficial 
allegations in the anglophone world about extensive active lawyer criminality are not 
yet testable from open source material. problems associated with solicitors sailing very 
close to the wind will increase as inancial instability and competition become more 
widespread. in the united States, a recent study suggests that law irms now are becom-
ing little more than temporary bands of mobile teams (Coates et al. 2011). thus, the 
institutional and reputational constraints on opportunism may have weakened, though 
this and the decline in business may promote lawyers’ willingness to become involved 
in ‘pure’ white-collar crime more than in ‘organized crime’. paradoxically, because of 
solicitors’ status as oficers of the court, upholders of the rule of law and the proper 
administration of justice, and as being well-organized and rational, getting into inan-
cial dificulties is either or all of: unthinkable, shameful, impossible to accept, beyond 
the expertise and experience of solicitors, etc. this sometimes leads to denial (in the 
psychoanalytic sense), and sometimes to a naive optimism that things will work out all 
right if only they can keep trading—e.g. using money from client account to cover the 
irm’s inancial obligations, billing for work that hasn’t been done (particularly where 
the irm is holding trust moneys), and obediently taking instructions from clients who 
are offering investors something that is ‘too good to be true’. the scope for delusion 
and self-deception is higher because of the perceived role of solicitors as custodians of 
the rule of law and because—unlike most ‘ordinary’ crimes—the crimes are not a clear 
break from legitimate behaviours that solicitors customarily perform.
we were surprised by how much had changed since the turn of the last century and, 
as the cliché goes, how much was the same: the archaic conveyancing system is wide 
open to fraud and highly attractive because of the large sums that can be quickly stolen. 
high-yield investment fraud was seen off by the early part of the 2000s but has reap-
peared. Changing social and political conditions have rendered legal aid fraud obso-
lete or less politically pressing. Lawyers became involved in boiler room scams and have 
facilitated land-banking fraud. the extent of intentional lawyer involvement in money 
laundering schemes remains only a little better understood now than a decade ago, and 
then, it is well evidenced mostly in a few grand Corruption cases.
the arrival of alternative Business Structures (aBSs) creates a new environment: 
the ‘banksters’ and others now can have direct access to the legal system. Law irms will 
perhaps be increasingly brought within the scope of corporate crime as well as direct 
(former professional) regulation. the scale of some frauds risks wiping out the SCf. it 
has been a form of collective reputational insurance for the solicitors’ profession (and 
hence is out of fashion with market-liberalizing regulation) as well as providing redress 
for victims of their dishonest colleagues. the Sra has limited those eligible to claim on 
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the SCf to individuals and small organizations, maintaining it as a source of compen-
sation for the genuinely vulnerable. the public goods of an honest and reliable legal 
system seem to be under-valued in the continued idolatry of free market competition, 
despite the inancial crisis of 2008. these shifts pose a continuing challenge to regula-
tors and indeed law enforcement. it is too early to assess with conidence the impact 
on organized and white-collar crime rates of these developments, although we note 
the apparent determined targeting of legal services by fraudsters and we wonder how 
this will play out now the circle has turned again, noting the LSB’s 2013 ‘Blueprint for 
deregulation’ (LSB 2013b).
we highlighted earlier that between the opportunity and the actuality of crime by pro-
fessionals falls the shadow. the shadow comprises not just unperceived and ungrasped 
opportunities by professionals and by outside criminals who could successfully corrupt 
professionals if they were bolder in making offers to them (and vice versa), but also 
the problems of ascertaining if and when professional misconduct has occurred. this 
is especially so of money laundering for others and for conlicts of interest which are 
undetected, as frauds by solicitors against their partners and clients and the laundering 
of the proceeds thereof may be more readily detected. there may also be a signiicant 
time lag before problems appear to regulators and to the public, if at all. Changes in the 
global regulatory apparatus and in national prosecution resources are also part of this 
complex matrix of controls, raising (like transnational bribery) issues such as whether 
tighter regulation in england and wales might simply transfer business to less moral 
lawyers in lighter regulated foreign jurisdictions. there remain symbolic struggles over 
the role of criminal law in sanctioning solicitor misconduct. for us, the notion that if 
crime is committed, the response should be either criminal justice or nothing seems 
absurd: the licensing and inspection regime for professionals may be expected to have a 
preventative effect on the scale of criminality, even if ex post facto professional sanctions 
do not deter completely, and especially if professional inspections and sanctions are 
much more likely than criminal conviction to happen. measuring these effects remains 
dificult and has not been seriously attempted. note that the 2013 Serious Organised Crime 
Strategy targets the very broad range of ‘corrupt, complicit or negligent professionals’.
all we have been able to do for the present is to map out some of the changes that 
have occurred in visible patterns of lawyer misconduct and in their regulatory and 
criminal environment, which constitutes ‘situational opportunity’ or ‘routine activities’ 
for crime. there is currently a rational and symbolic push by law enforcement bodies 
to act more irmly and strategically against ‘crime enablers’, and we have sought to 
lesh out some of the visible dimensions of this set of social risks which, like all ‘crime 
control’ constructs, unintentionally or otherwise de-emphasizes the positive features 
of lawyering. at this stage, despite international differences in both rules and practices 
of the regulation of the legal profession, the extent of cross-border arbitrage by those 
looking for lawyers to help commit or conceal crimes and their proceeds remains more 
alleged than proven. the extent to which current culture and ethical rules—rather 
than a crude economistic ‘rational choice’ calculus—constrain lawyer criminality is not 
easy to test. those providing legal services sometimes merit the cynical sobriquet applied 
by al Capone of ‘the legitimate rackets’: but it remains to be seen what will rise from the 
current convulsions in the market—and what public goods remain at the end of these 
processes of economic and professional change and of the public anathematization of 
lawyers.
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